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 Abstract-- The US Department of Energy (DOE) is embarking 
on a series of tests of TRIstructural ISOtropic (TRISO) coated-
particle reactor fuel for the Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR). As 
one part of this fuel development program, a series of eight (8) 
fuel irradiation tests are planned for the Idaho National 
Laboratory’s (INL’s) Advanced Test Reactor (ATR). The first 
test in this series (AGR-1) will incorporate six separate capsules 
irradiated simultaneously, each containing about 51,000 TRISO-
coated fuel particles supported in a graphite matrix and 
continuously swept with inert gas during irradiation. The effluent 
gas from each of the six capsules must be independently 
monitored in near real time and the activity of various fission gas 
nuclides determined and reported. 
 A set of seven heavily-shielded, high-purity germanium 
(HPGe) gamma-ray spectrometers and sodium iodide [NaI(Tl)] 
scintillation detector-based total radiation detectors have been 
designed and are being configured and tested for use during the 
AGR-1 experiment. The AGR-1 test specification requires that 
the fission product measurement system (FPMS) have sufficient 
sensitivity to detect the failure of a single coated fuel particle and 
sufficient range to allow it to “count” multiple (up to 250) 
successive particle failures. This paper describes the design and 
expected performance of the AGR-1 FPMS.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The US Department of Energy (DOE) is embarking on a 
series of tests of coated-particle reactor fuel for the Advanced 
Gas Reactor (AGR) [1]. The AGR is a near-term deployment 
option (possibly deployable in the next 10 years) for the Very 
High-Temperature Reactor (VHTR) system. The VHTR 
appears to be the nearest term option for cogeneration of 
electricity and hydrogen. The primary distinguishing features 
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of VHTRs are the use of helium coolant, a low-power-density 
ceramic core capable of withstanding very high temperatures, 
and coated-particle fuel. As one part of this fuel development 
program a series of eight fuel irradiation tests are planned for 
the Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL’s) Advanced Test 
Reactor (ATR). One important measure of the fuel 
performance in these irradiation experiments is quantification 
of the fission gas release over the nominal 2-year duration of 
each irradiation. 
Each of the planned fuel test experiments will incorporate a 
multi-capsule fuel test train inserted into an irradiation position 
in the ATR. The effluent gas from each of the six capsules 
must be independently monitored in near real time and the 
activity of various fission gas nuclides determined and 
reported. To meet this important test objective (and provide 
one spare), a set of 7 heavily-shielded high-purity germanium 
(HPGe) gamma-ray spectrometers and sodium iodide [NaI(Tl)] 
scintillation detector-based total radiation detectors have been 
designed and are being configured and tested for use during 
the AGR-1 experiment. This collection of radiation 
measurement systems constitutes the AGR-1 Fission Product 
Monitoring System (FPMS). 
The AGR-1 test specification [2] requires that the AGR-1 
FPMS have sufficient sensitivity to detect the failure of a 
single coated fuel particle and sufficient range to allow it to 
“count” multiple (up to 250) successive particle failures. (It 
should be noted that less than 10 actual failures per capsule are 
expected.) This paper describes the design and expected 
performance of the AGR-1 FPMS.  
II. THE AGR-1 EXPERIMENT
The first test in the series of eight scheduled AGR fuel 
irradiation experiments is the AGR-1 test. The AGR-1 test is 
presently scheduled to begin irradiation in September 2006. 
The AGR-1 “test train” (the in-reactor portion of the 
experiment) incorporates 6 individual test capsules. Each 
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capsule contains 12 fuel “compacts” arranged in three stacks 
of four compacts per stack supported in a graphite matrix. 
Each compact contains about 4300 TRISO-coated fuel 
particles, thus each capsule will contain about 51,000 fuel 
particles. Each individual capsule is continuously swept with 
an inert sweep gas during irradiation. The FPMS continuously 
monitors the sweep gas effluent from each capsule to provide 
fuel integrity data. 
The test design, irradiation schedule, and the irradiation 
position in the ATR have been carefully chosen to mimic as 
closely as possible the fuel temperature, neutronics, and 
expected fuel burn up of the AGR environment. To reach the 
specified minimum fuel compact-averaged burn up of >14% 
FIMA (fissions per initial metal atom) will require a test 
duration of about two years. 
One of the critical parameters to be controlled in these 
experiments is the fuel temperature. Temperature control is 
effected by varying the composition, and thus the thermal 
properties of the sweep gas. The gases that can be used to 
provide the needed thermal and reactivity control include He, 
Ne and 3He. The sweep gas system also carries any released 
fission gases to the FPMS for measurement 
Figure 1 presents a simplified diagram of the AGR-1 gas 
flow and fission product monitoring system. The sweep 
Fig. 1. A simplified diagram of the AGR-1 sweep gas flow and fission 
product monitoring system. 
gas from each individual fuel capsule flows to a gross radiation 
detection system and gamma-ray spectrometer dedicated to 
monitoring that capsule’s effluent. To provide redundancy in 
the case of a detector failure, the effluent from any individual 
capsule or any selected combination of capsule effluents can 
be routed to a seventh spectrometer and gross activity monitor, 
or can be sampled at the grab sample station. Fission gas 
transport times from capsule to spectrometer are expected to 
be on the order of 100 to 300 seconds. 
The FPMS is required to monitor the fuel performance by 
sensing and quantifying the increased fission gas activity in the 
sweep gas following a particle failure (meaning the rupture of 
a particle’s TRISO coating). This activity increase must be 
sensed over a continuous fission gas release from any “tramp” 
uranium contamination of the fuel particles or compacts, and 
from a small number of initially defective fuel particles. 
III. THE FISSION PRODUCT MONITORING SYSTEM 
A. Sample routing and FPMS installation 
The AGR-1 FPMS incorporates seven heavily-shielded 
gamma-ray spectrometers and gross gamma-ray radiation 
monitors – one for each of the individual capsule effluent lines 
and a redundant seventh unit. The gamma-ray spectrometer 
detectors are closed-end coaxial hyperpure germanium (HPGe) 
detectors with a nominal relative efficiency of 10%. The gross 
gamma-ray radiation monitor detectors are ∅25 mm X 25 mm 
NaI(Tl) detectors. 
Each capsule effluent line (there are six) exits the reactor 
vessel through an experiment flange, routes the gas through a 
particulate filter (primarily for protection against irradiated 
particles downstream), and then enters into a shielded 
“cubicle” in the ATR basement separated from the 
spectrometer-containing cubicle by a thick concrete shielding 
wall. Each sample line then penetrates the wall, passes through 
the associated gross activity monitor, and then into the HPGe 
spectrometer shield where it flows through a 50 cm3 sample 
chamber enclosed in a beaker located at the center bottom of 
each shield. The sample chamber is viewed by the HPGe 
detector from below through a collimator. 
Each HPGe detector is installed in a shield providing a 
nominal 10 cm of copper-lined lead surrounding the detector 
and sample. The shields were procured commercially. This 
shielding arrangement is similar to that used successfully for a 
multidetector system presently installed and operating in the 
ATR for monitoring a different experiment. Figure 2 presents a 
cutaway diagram of the detector, shield, and sample 
arrangement.  
The gross activity monitors incorporate ∅25 mm X 25 mm 
NaI(Tl) detectors with integral photomultipliers, voltage 
dividers, and preamplifiers. Each NaI(Tl) detector is installed 
in a specially fabricated shield that protects against ambient 
background radiation and ensures a view of a 25-mm long 
segment of the sample line. The gross activity monitor shield 
assembly attaches to the spectrometer shield between the 
shield and the cubicle wall. 
B. Instrumentation and control 
Spectrometer and gross activity monitor electronics are in 
equipment racks located just outside the spectrometer cubicle 
door. The FPMS control computer is also located in these 
racks. 
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The spectrometer electronics consist of a main shaping 
amplifier and an analog-to-digital converter (ADC) feeding the 
histogramming memory of a Canberra Acquisition Interface 
Module (AIM). Each AIM provides 8192 channels of MCA 
memory for two ADCs. Each ADC has been modified to 
include an interface that, with a stable dual amplitude pulser 
installed on each detector, implements the technique of pulse 
injection with subsequent removal [3], a technology that we 
have found to be indispensable in unattended, on-line 
monitoring systems. The AIMs communicate with the control 
computer via Ethernet. 
The NaI(Tl) gross detector electronics include a shaping 
amplifier providing input to the multichannel scaler (MCS) 
input of a Canberra Multiport II. Each Multiport II provides 4 
MCS inputs. The Multiport IIs communicate with the control 
computer via a universal serial bus (USB).  
The control computer is high-end personal computer with 
dual 3.2 GHz 64 bit (XENON) processors running the 
Windows XP operating system. The control computer 
communicates with the laboratory’s intranet through one 
Ethernet interface and with the FPMS electronics through a 
separate Ethernet interface and the computer’s USB interface. 
Figure 3 illustrates this configuration. 
Acquisition control and data archival and analysis software 
have been developed to automate the acquisition and analysis 
tasks. The control software is designed to operate without 
continual operator intervention. The communications between 
the control program and the Canberra acquisition modules are 
carried out through a proprietary Canberra Virtual Data 
Manager (VDM). The VDM handles all of the low-level 
communications between the control program and the MCA 
hardware. The control program communicates with the VDM 
using the proprietary Canberra Genie 2000 Programming 
Library. 
 Fig. 3 Schematic depiction of the FPMS hardware. Only one set of gross 
monitor and spectrometer electronics are shown. 
The main process thread of the software provides the control 
interface to the user for setting the sequencing and timing of 
the fission product measurements. Independent processing 
threads control each spectrometer and gross monitor. 
Normal operation is a loop in which the acquisition runs for 
a preset time after which data is transmitted, stored, the 
acquisition restarted, and the acquired data analyzed to provide 
a “quick look” at sample conditions. The control interface also 
alerts the operator to any error conditions detected by the 
individual spectrometer processing threads. Acquired data 
stored on the control computer disk are routinely backed up to 
a remote disk in a different building via a connection to the 
laboratory network. Operators may interface to the control 
computer via the Remote Desktop feature of Windows XP. 
IV. EVALUATION OF EXPECTED SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
A. Source term estimates 
The AGR-1 FPMS is required to have sufficient sensitivity 
and range to detect and quantify the fission gas release from 
each TRISO particle failure in each capsule up to and 
including the unlikely prospect of 250 possible failures. To 
evaluate the system performance relative to this specification 
requires an estimate of the fission gas release expected under 
various test conditions. 
The expected fission product inventories in each test capsule 
were modeled in detail using a calculational approach, termed 
Monte Carlo With ORIGEN (MCWO), that couples the Monte 
Carlo-based MCNP-4C transport code with the build-up and 
depletion code ORIGEN2 [4]. The detailed calculation divided 
each of the six test capsules into multiple “nodes”. A typical 
ATR operating power and power tilt were presumed, as was a 
typical ATR repetitive operating schedule of 40 continuous 
days at full power followed by a 7-day shutdown period. 
Calculations were continued to a total exposure of 760 
effective full power days (EFPD) or a total test duration of 893 
days (about 2.5 years). Because of certain test train design 
Fig. 2 Cutaway diagram of an AGR-1 spectrometer detector and
shield
features (incorporation of some neutron poisons in the graphite 
holders and a Hafnium absorber on the core side of each 
capsule) at any given time during the irradiation, the maximum 
and minimum fission rates (and thus the resulting fission 
product inventories) among the six vertically arrayed capsules 
and among the three fuel stacks within a capsule differed by 
less than 30% [5]. The calculated inventories for a node near 
the fission rate maximum were chosen for the release estimate 
calculations.  
Fission product release data from a TRISO-coated fuel 
experiment run in the ATR in 1991 elucidate the fission gas 
release profile expected when an irradiated particle fails. The 
NPR-1A experiment was fueled with an early generation of 
TRISO-coated particles and was run at conditions beyond the 
fuel performance limits; consequently, a number of particles 
failed during this experiment [6]. Figure 4 presents the 
response noted by the gross gamma-ray monitor when the first 
particle failed in the NPR-1A experiment. 
Fig. 4 Response of the gross gamma-ray monitor to the first TRISO-coated 
fuel particle failure during the NPR-1A experiment. 
Note in Fig. 4 that there is a low, but non-zero counting rate 
prior to the particle failure (due to a small fraction of initial 
defected particles and/or “tramp” uranium contamination of 
the particles or compacts), the counting rate spikes rapidly at 
particle failure when the stored particle inventory is released, 
and then stabilizes in a few minutes to a steady-state rate 
slightly higher than that before failure. The rate after failure is 
elevated because of releases from the continued irradiation of 
the newly defected particle.  
We have estimated capsule fission gas releases for a number 
of expected conditions during the AGR-1 experiment using a 
combination of a transient release model and a steady-state 
release model. Both models used release-to-birth ratios 
computed from a Booth diffusion model based on semi-
empirical diffusion coefficients recommended for modern 
TRISO fuel particles [7]. The transient release model releases 
a computed fraction of the particle fission gas inventory into 
the flowing gas stream for a release interval of one minute. 
The released inventory fraction for each fission gas nuclide is 
determined from diffusion calculations for that nuclide. The 
steady state release prior to the first particle failure is that 
computed for release from an amount of “tramp” uranium 
contamination and initially-failed particles at the allowable 
maximum of the fuel performance specifications. As each 
particle fails, its steady state release is added to the tramp 
uranium and prior particle releases to estimate a new total 
release value. Details of these models are provided in a 
published report [8]. 
B. The Expected Gross Gamma-Ray Detector Response 
The response of the gross gamma-ray detector is expected to 
reflect the total fission gas concentration in the viewed section 
of the line. For irradiation periods early in the test (4 EFPD), at 
the mid point of the experiment (244 EFPD), and near the end 
of the irradiation (760 EFPD), the fission gas nuclide releases 
computed (as above) before, during, and after a given particle 
failure were corrected for dilution by the inert gas flow and for 
decay during transport to the detector station (nominally 2.5 
minutes), and the volume viewed by the detector. These 
activities were then summed to estimate the activity profile 
viewed by the gross detector. 
The gross detector response to the first particle failure, using 
inventory values at 244 EFPD, is presented Figure 5. Note the 
similarity to the NPR-1A particle failure response (Fig. 4).  
In a similar manner, the expected response to the failure of a 
TRISO particle after 250 prior particle failures might have 
occurred has been computed and is presented in Figure 6. The 
model predicts that the 251st particle failure should be 
detectable by the gross detector system, even above the 
elevated background from the prior failures  
C. The Expected Gamma-ray Spectrometer Response 
The expected performance of the AGR-1 gamma-ray 
spectrometers was evaluated using the spectral simulation 
program SYNTH [9] and the modeled steady-state release 
concentrations. The modeled releases were corrected for 
dilution by the inert gas flow and for decay during transport to 
the spectrometer location. The spectrometer views a 50-cm3
volume of this flowing gas mixture. Fission gas first daughter 
decay progeny were also modeled as present in an amount 
computed from the parent concentration. The detector 
parameters and the modeled geometry were adjusted to 
provide a photopeak efficiency response equal to that 
measured for this spectrometer configuration. The spectral 
counting time was set to 10 hours – a value less than half the 
allowable 24 hour counting time. The system gain was set to 
store an energy range of 0 to 3 MeV in the modeled 8192 
channels. The background prior to the first particle failure was 
the steady-state release from initial fuel defects at the 
maximum allowed by the fuel specification. 
Spectra were synthesized at exposure times of 4, 284, and 
760 EFPD, and in all cases the activity increase due to a 
particle failure was easily detectable. When these spectra were 
analyzed, the net single particle release activities of most 
fission gas nuclides were quantified with precisions (expressed 
as one relative standard deviation) of less than ±2%. When 
spectrometry systems are operating near their detection limit 
relative standard deviations of >40% are common. 
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Fig. 5 The modeled total fission gas activity profile at the gross detector for 
the failure of the first TRISO particle at about 244EFPD. Note the similarity 
between the modeled results and the NPR-1A measurement presented in Fig 4
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Fig. 6 Modeled fission gas activity profile at the gross detector for the failure 
of the 251st particle failure. 
The modeled initial condition (background) spectra at 4, 
284, and 760 EFPD were analyzed to determine the fission gas 
activities that could be expected to be detected with high 
(95%) confidence. The approach was to compute (following 
the formulation of Currie [10]) the net photopeak area increase 
detectable with nominally 95% confidence above the expected 
background (from initial defects) from the synthesized 10-hour 
duration spectra and their analyses. These peak areas, when 
converted to activities define the “system sensitivity 
parameters” (SSPs) presented in Table 1. Others might term 
these SSP values “Minimum Detectable Activities” (MDAs), 
but since they are not the minimum activities detectable under 
these conditions, but rather the activities detectable with high 
(95%) confidence, we avoid that designation. Table 1 also 
compares the SSPs (in microCuries) with the expected releases 
from a particle failure. Note that the fission gas releases 
expected from a single particle failure are several times the 
level that should be reliably detected.  
TABLE  I
EXPECTED SYSTEM SENSITIVITY PARAMETERS (SSPS) EXPRESSED AS THE 
ACTIVITY (µCi) DETECTABLE WITH A CONFIDENCE OF ABOUT 95% COMPARED 
WITH THE EXPECTED RELEASE FROM THE FIRST PARTICLE FAILURE.
Isotope 
Primary  
Gamma-ray 
(keV) 
SSP
(µCi) 
Single 
Particle 
Release  
(µCi) 
Ratio  
Single 
Particle 
Release/SSP 
Kr-85m 151.2 0.0017 0.033 19 
Kr-87 402.6 0.033 0.12 3.5 
Kr-88 2392.1 0.009 0.11 12 
Kr-89 586 0.026 0.57 22 
Xe-135m 526.6 0.003 1.3 507 
Xe-137 455.5 0.016 2.7 177 
Xe-138 258.4 0.012 0.48 39 
Xe-139 218.6 0.011 1.2 110 
V. SUMMARY
A fission product monitoring system (FPMS) consisting of 
seven NaI(Tl)-based gross gamma-ray monitors and seven 
HPGe-detector-based spectrometers has been designed to 
monitor the effluent from AGR-1 capsules irradiated in the 
ATR for fission gas content. Modeling results indicate that the 
FPMS should be capable of detecting each individual TRISO 
particle failure and counting up to 250 successive failures. 
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